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The year 2004 witnessed a vast outpouring of scholarship celebrating and analyzing the
fiftieth anniversary of the Supreme Court=s decision in Brown v. Board of Education.1 The
magnitude of this literature reflects the impact of Brown not only on the development of
constitutional jurisprudence, but also on the overall pattern of race relations in America. By
holding that state-mandated segregation in schools violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Court brought an end to the American system of official racial
apartheid and set in motion a series of events that have dramatically altered the relationship
between whites and African-Americans in our society more generally. Thus, the scope of the
reaction to the anniversary of the decision was entirely predictable and understandable.
The attention lavished on Brown stands in marked contrast to the treatment of Tee-HitTon-Indians v. United States,2 which was handed down less than a year later. The context in
which Tee-Hit-Ton was decided was in many ways analogous to that of Brown itself. Like
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Brown, Tee-Hit-Ton profoundly effected the rights of a racial minority that had suffered greatly
at the hands of the white majority B in this case, Native Americans. Moreover, during the late
nineteenth century and early twentieth centuries, the Court had shown no more sympathy for the
plight of Native Americans than it had for African-Americans. However, the ultimate result in
Tee-Hit-Ton could not have been more different than that in Brown. Rather than breaking new
ground in defense of Native American rights, the Court issued one of the most retrograde Indian
law decisions of the twentieth century B a decision that commentators have argued is marked by
Ablatant racism,@3 and analogous to the Court=s infamous 1857 decisions in Dred Scott v.
Sanford.4
The ironies inherent in the juxtaposition of Brown and Tee-Hit-Ton have been ignored in
the widespread discussions and celebrations that have surrounded the fiftieth anniversary of
Brown.5 Indeed, with the exception of a small band of Property teachers and Indian law experts,
few scholars take any note of Tee-Hit-Ton at all; the case is typically ignored even in detailed
studies of the structure and impact of Warren Court jurisprudence generally.6 This article, by
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Not surprisingly, Tee-Hit-Ton has received much more attention from specialists in
Indian law. The most complete treatment of the background and impact of the case is Newton,
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contrast, will explore the lessons that can be learned from the Court=s disparate treatment of the
two cases. The article will begin by briefly recapitulating the events that ultimately led to the
Brown decision. Next, the article will outline the complex doctrinal background of Tee-Hit-Ton
and discuss the analysis of the Tee-Hit-Ton Court itself. Finally, the article will describe the
forces that led the Court to its very different conclusions in Brown and Tee-Hit-Ton.
I. Brown v. Board of Education
The tale of Brown v. Board of Education is one of the best-known stories in legal history.
The story begins with the adoption of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Drafted by Northern Republicans in response to what they viewed as the
unwillingness of Southerners to accept the full consequences of their defeat in the Civil War, the
amendment was proposed by Congress in 1866 and ratified by the requisite number of states in
1868.7 The Equal Protection Clause itself was part of section one of the amendment, which in
turn was intended to guarantee at least a measure of legal equality to African-Americans.
Nonetheless, most commentators have concluded that the framers of the amendment did not have
a specific intention to outlaw racial segregation in the public schools.8 Many, however, have also
argued that the language of the clause by its terms suggests a more general commitment to a
principle of equality that is broad enough to encompass a requirement that the state not segregate
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its schools by race.9
Ultimately, of course, the Supreme Court was called upon to determine the scope of the
protections provided by the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court=s first major pronouncement on
the constitutionality of racial segregation came in its 1896 decision in Plessy v. Ferguson.10 In
Plessy, with only a single dissent, the Court rejected a Fourteenth Amendment challenge to a
Louisiana statute that required the operators of street railways to maintain separate but equal
facilities for white passengers and their African-American counterparts. Speaking for the
majority, Justice Henry B. Brown first rejected a Thirteenth Amendment challenge to the statute,
declaring that "[a] statute which implies merely a legal distinction between the races...has no
tendency to destroy the legal equality of the two races, or re-establish a state of involuntary
servitude."11 Turning to the Fourteenth Amendment, Brown began by sketching in general terms
his vision of the reach of the amendment
The object of the amendment was undoubtedly to enforce the absolute equality of
the two races before the law, but in the nature of things it could not have been
intended to abolish distinctions based upon color, as distinguished from political
equality, or a commingling of the two races upon grounds unsatisfactory to
either.12
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The key question, of course, was how one was to define the phrase "equality...before the
law." In part, Brown's treatment of this issue reflected the evolution of the Republican position
on race during the Reconstruction era. At the time the Fourteenth Amendment was drafted,
many Republicans drew a sharp distinction between civil rights and political rights, and the
drafters made a conscious decision not to directly protect political rights.13 For Brown, by
contrast, political equality was an essential element of equality before the law, and he cited the
jury discrimination struck down in Strauder v. West Virginia14 as the classic example of a
forbidden racial classification. Outside the area of political rights, however, Brown was far more
willing to countenance the use of race in government decisionmaking. He cited a series of state
court cases that had upheld school segregation as paradigms for the view that some racially-based
laws did not violate Fourteenth Amendment principles.15
Having established the parameters of his analysis, Brown next turned to the case law that
had dealt specifically with the issue of segregation by common carriers, concluding that the right
of access to public conveyances did not merit special constitutional protection. He then applied a
rational basis test, noting that "every exercise of the police power must be reasonable, and extend
only to such laws as are enacted for the promotion of the public good, and not for the annoyance
or oppression of a particular class."16 Characterizing the Louisiana statute as an appropriate
measure to ensure "good order" and the comfort of passengers of all races, Brown then proceeded
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to the most widely-quoted portion of his opinion
We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff's argument to consist in the
assumption that the enforced separation of the two races stamps the colored race
with a badge of inferiority. If this be so, it is not by reason of anything found in
the act, but solely because the colored race chooses to put that construction upon
it...Legislation is powerless to eradicate racial instincts or to abolish distinctions
based upon physical differences, and the attempt to do so can only result in
accentuating the difficulties of the present situation. If the civil and political
rights of both races be equal one cannot be inferior to the other civilly or
politically. If one race be inferior to the other socially, the Constitution of the
United States cannot put them on the same plane.17
Three years later, the Court addressed the specific issue of racial segregation in
schools in Cumming v. County Board of Education.18 In Cumming, a group of AfricanAmerican parents launched a Fourteenth Amendment challenge to the use of their tax
dollars to support a high school for whites where no analogous institution was provided
for the education of blacks. Speaking for a unanimous Court, Justice John Marshall
Harlan, whose dissent in Plessy has become justly famous, rejected the black parents'
contentions. The specific basis for his ruling was that even if there were a Fourteenth
Amendment violation in the allocation of funds, an injunction which undermined the
17
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white school was not an appropriate remedy.19 At the same time, however the opinion
seemed to implicitly approve the concept of segregated schools20 and closed with this
language
while all admit that the benefits and burdens of public taxation must be shared by
citizens without discrimination on account of their race, the education of the
people in schools maintained by state taxation is a matter belonging to the
respective states, and any interference on the part of Federal authority with the
management of such schools cannot be justified except in the case of a clear and
unmistakable disregard of rights secured by the supreme law of the land.21
If any doubt remained about the constitutionality of the practice of maintaining segregated
public schools, it was dispelled by the 1927 decision in Gong Lum v. Rice.22 In Gong Lum, the
state of Mississippi required the daughter of a Chinese merchant to attend the public school for
African-Americans, rather than the school for whites. The Court unanimously rejected an equal
protection challenge to this decision. Citing Plessy, Cumming and a variety of state court cases,
Chief Justice William Howard Taft argued that the case presented Athe same question which has
been many times decided to be within the constitutional power of the state Legislature [sic] to
settle@23 and that while A[m]ost of the cases cited arose...over the establishment of separate
schools as between white pupils and black pupils; but we cannot think that the question is any
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different...where the issue is as between white pupils and pupils of the colored races.@24
By its terms, the prevailing doctrine of the Plessy/Gong Lum era required the states to
provide equal facilities for whites and African-Americans. Nonetheless, in practice, the school
systems in states which mandated racial segregation were both separate and unequal. Beginning
in 1937 with Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada,25 a series of Supreme Court decisions involving
law schools clearly signaled that the Court was taking the requirement of equality very seriously
indeed.26 However, by its nature, attacks based on the theory that the schools provided to
African-Americans were inferior to those attended by whites required laborious, case-by-case
challenges to the specific conditions that existed in each school system. Thus, those seeking to
improve educational opportunities for African-American children decided to mount an assault on
the basic principles that the Court had enunciated in Plessy. Brown and its companion cases
were the vehicles for that assault.
Brown was first argued before the Court during its October, 1952 term. In the conference
that followed the argument, the justices split along geographic lines.27 Justices Felix Frankfurter
of Massachusetts, William O. Douglas of Connecticut, Robert H. Jackson of New York, Harold
H. Burton of Ohio, and Sherman Minton of IndianaBall of whom were appointed from states that
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had been free states at the outbreak of the Civil WarBwere apparently in favor of overturning
Plessy; among the free state justices, only Robert H. Jackson appeared to be undecided.28
Conversely, three of the four justices from former slave statesBChief Justice Frederick M. Vinson
of Missouri and Justices Stanley F. Reed of Kentucky and Thomas C. Clark of TexasB initially
argued that Plessy should remain good law. Only Justice Hugo L. Black crossed the regional
divide and joined the Northerners in advocating the abandonment of Plessy.
Even those justices who favored overruling Plessy recognized that such a decision would
engender great political upheaval in the South, and that the scope of this upheaval would likely
be magnified if the decision were not unanimous. Hoping to find some way to compose their
differences, they put Brown over for reargument, directing the attorneys on both sides to address
the original understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment. In the interim, Chief Justice Vinson
died, and was replaced by Earl Warren of California. Warren personally favored overruling
Plessy, and after the reargument he Clark was soon convinced to join the majority. Reed was the
final holdout; however, cognizant of the desirability of unanimity and faced with the reality that
Plessy was going to be overruled in any event, he relented as well. Thus, on May 17, 1954,
Warren announced that the Court had concluded unanimously that the government could not
require public schools to be segregated on the basis of race.
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The price of unanimity was a nonaccusatory, bland opinion that focused narrowly on the
impact of segregated schools on African-American children. Warren began by describing the
discussions surrounding the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment as Ainconclusive@ on the
question of whether the maintenance of segregated schools was originally understood to be
rendered unconstitutional by the Equal Protection Clause.29 He also argued that, in any event,
public schools had grown in importance in the intervening years, declaring that A[t]oday,
education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments@30 and that Ait is
doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he has been denied the
opportunity of an education.@31 Citing modern psychological studies which suggested that
African-Americans suffered psychological harm from being educated in a segregated
environment,32 Warren concluded that Ain the field of public education, the doctrine of >separate
but equal= has no place. Separate education facilities are inherently unequal.@33
While the decision in Brown clearly outlawed racial segregation in schools operated by
state governments and their subdivisions, it did not directly resolve the issue of segregation in the
District of Columbia public schools. These schools were operated by an institution of the federal
government, and by its terms the Equal Protection Clause applies only to the states. However,
from a political perspective, it would have been unthinkable to outlaw segregation in the states
and leave the federal government free to classify students on the basis of race. Thus, in Bolling
29
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v. Sharpe,34 Warren concluded that the maintenance of segregated schools was also prohibited by
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Given the reasoning of the Court in Brown, in theory the impact of the decision might
have been limited to the specific context of school segregation. However, the Court soon made it
clear that it viewed Brown as establishing the principle that government-imposed racial
segregation generally violated the Equal Protection Clause, as well as the Fifth Amendment Due
Process Clause.35 Thus, although some have questioned its practical significance,36 Brown
clearly stands as an important milestone in the struggle for racial justice in America. Tee-HitTon, by contrast, is a milestone of a quite different sort.
II. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States
In Tee-Hit-Ton, the Court was called upon to resolve the constitutional status of
aboriginal title in landBtitle that Native Americans derived not from treaties, but rather from their
status as preexisting occupants of the territory that became the United States. Even prior to the
Tee-Hit-Ton decision, the Court had consistently held that Congress had broad authority to
abrogate such claims, asserting that A[t]he power of Congress in that regard is supreme. The
manner, method and time of such extinguishment raise political, not justiciable, issues.@37
However, while the right of Congress to extinguish aboriginal title was well established, the
question of whether Native Americans had a constitutional right to compensation for the
34
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extinction of aboriginal title had not been clearly answered prior to 1955.
The issue came to the Tee-Hit-Ton Court against the background of a long and complex
series of doctrinal developments. The Court first directly addressed the issue of Indian land
rights in1810, in Fletcher v. Peck.38 In Fletcher, the state legislature of Georgia had conveyed to
private parties a large tract of land that was occupied by Indians. One of the grounds for
challenging the sale was based on the theory that the Indian tribes possessed sufficient title to
prevent the state of Georgia from holding a fee simple in the property. Speaking for a majority of
the Court, Chief Justice John Marshall rejected this argument, concluding that "the nature of
Indian title, which is certainly to be respected by all courts, until it is legitimately extinguished, is
not such as to be absolutely repugnant to seisin in fee on the part of the state."39 Thus, although
Marshall recognized the authority of the state government to convey title in land occupied by
Native Americans, the language of the opinion strongly suggested that the grantee would take
subject to the interest inherent in aboriginal title.
In any event, the treatment of the Indian land claims in Fletcher was only a prelude to the
pivotal decision in Johnson v. M=Intosh.40 Johnson arose from a dispute over title to a number of
parcels of land in southern Illinois and Indiana.. The claims of the plaintiffs derived from private
purchases made directly by white land speculators from the Illinois and Piankeshaw Indians in
1773 and 1775, respectively; at the time of the transactions, such private purchases were
38
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forbidden by the British Proclamation of 1763. Subsequent to these purchases, after the victory
of the colonists in the Revolutionary War, the Indian tribes ceded the same land to the United
States government by treaty. The government had in turn sold the land to the defendants in
Johnson. The question in the case was which claim had priority.
The theoretical difficulties in Johnson derived in large measure from the somewhat
ambiguous position of the right to acquire and convey real property generally. On one hand, the
right to own real property was characterized by prominent authorities such as Sir William
Blackstone and Emmerich de Vattel as a natural right.41 On the other, it was closely related to
membership in a political community. Thus, in theory, under English law, title to all real
property was ultimately traced to the Crown, and in general, noncitizens could legitimately be
denied the right to acquire such property.42.
The problem in Johnson was that the case involved the rights of two different entities
claiming sovereign authority over the same parcels of land. Of course, the rights of the United
States were derived from their treaties with the Illinois and Piankeshaw Indian tribes. However,
if prior to the execution of the treaties the Indian tribes had possessed full sovereign authority
over the land, then the prior conveyance to the land speculators would have priority over the sale
from the United States. Thus, Johnson necessarily raised the question of which sovereign had
ultimate authority over the land that was in dispute.
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The claim of the United States derived from the English assertion of dominion over the
land in question. As a theoretical matter, however, it was far from clear why this claim should
supercede the rights of the Indian tribe as the original inhabitants of the land--a status which
normally carried with it a right to assert sovereign authority.43 Some early authorities had
suggested that, as infidels, Indians lacked the capacity to exercise legally cognizable sovereign
rights over the land in which they lived.44 Vattel, a leading jurisprude of the late eighteenth
century, took a somewhat different tack in his classic Law of Nations. He combined the doctrine
that nations could validly assert claims to land that they discovered with one of the most
important themes in the rhetoric of white supremacy--the superiority of an lifestyle and economy
based on agricultural life to one based upon hunting and fishing.
It is asked whether a Nation may lawfully occupy any part of a vast territory in
which are to be found only wandering tribes whose small numbers cannot
populate the whole country. [Because] of the obligation of cultivating the
earth...these tribes cannot take to themselves more land than they have need of or
can inhabit and cultivate. Their uncertain occupancy of these vast regions can not
be held as a real and lawful taking of possession; and when the Nations of Europe,
which are too confined at home, come upon lands which the savages have no
special need of and are making no present and continuous use of, they may
lawfully take possession of them and establish colonies in them.45

43

Vattel, supra n. , at 84-85; Williams, supra n. , at 98-100.

44

Williams, supra n. , at 209-11..

45

Vattel, supra n. , at 85.

Whatever the theoretical merits of these arguments, their impact was buttressed by
important pragmatic considerations. What was at stake in Johnson was no less than the ability of
the United States government to control and regularize the disposition of the territory over which
it claimed sovereignty. A decision granting priority to the land speculators' deed would have
created a regime under which the title to federal lands would have been effectively controlled not
by the federal government, but rather by the numerous Indian tribes that had inhabited the land
prior to the arrival of European explorers.
Under these circumstances, it should be no surprise that the Supreme Court ruled
unanimously against the land speculators. Speaking for the Court, Chief Justice Marshall relied
in part on the fact that the original purchase from the Indians had been invalid under the
proclamation of 1763.46 In addition, however, he engaged in a wide-ranging analysis of the
status of Indian titles in the United States. Marshall began this analysis with a detailed account
of the chain of events which underlay the British claim of title to the Indian lands. He then
addressed the relationship between this claim and natural law arguments that supported the rights
of the Indians themselves (and thus the arguments of the speculators). Marshall argued that the
Supreme Court was in essence a conduit for the sovereign authority of the government of the
United States, and as such was bound to vindicate the policies of that government, even in the
face of contrary natural law principles
The United States ...have unequivocally acceded to that great and broad rule by
which its civilized inhabitants now hold this country. They hold, and assert in
themselves, the title by which it was acquired. They maintain...that discovery

46

Johnson, 21 U.S. at 564.

gave an exclusive right to extinguish the Indian title of occupancy, either by
purchase or conquest.
We will not enter the controversy, whether agriculturists, merchants and
manufacturers have a right, on abstract principles, to expel hunters from the
territory they possess, or to contract their limits...The British government...whose
rights have passed to the United States, asserted title to all the lands occupied by
Indians, within the chartered limits of the British colonies...It is not for the courts
of this country to question the validity of this title, or to sustain one which is
incompatible with it.47
One problem remained, however; under widely-accepted principles of international law,
conquerors generally recognized the private property rights of conquered peoples, and
incorporated them into its citizenry.48 Marshall was clearly cognizant of this problem49 and
sought to deal with it by resorting to the image of the Indians as savages whose way of life was
incompatible with European values
The tribes of Indians inhabiting this country were fierce savages, whose
occupation was war, and whose subsistence was drawn chiefly from the forest.
To leave them in possession of their country, was to leave the country a
wilderness: to govern them as a distinct people, was impossible, because they
were as brave and high-spirited as they were fierce, and were ready to repel by
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arms every attempt on their independence.50
The two strands of Marshall's analysis came together in his ultimate description of the status of
Indian land titles
However extravagant the pretension of converting the discovery of an inhabited country
into conquest may appear; if the principle has been asserted in the first instance and
afterwards sustained; if a country has been acquired and held under it; if the property of
the great mass of the community originates in it, it becomes the law of the land, and
cannot be questioned. So, too, with respect to the concomitant principle, that the Indian
inhabitants are to be considered merely as occupants, to be protected, indeed, while in
peace in the possession of their lands, but to be deemed incapable of transferring the
absolute right to others. However this restriction may be opposed to natural right, and to
the usages of civilized nations, yet, if it be indispensable to that system under which the
country has been settled, and be adapted to the actual condition of the two people, it may,
perhaps, be supported by reason, and certainly cannot be rejected by courts of justice.51
Obviously, Johnson was something less than a major victory for the supporters of Indian
land rights. However, Chief Justice Marshall did not conclude that the legal rights of Native
Americans had been totally extinguished by the doctrine of discovery. Instead, he explicitly
noted that until the discoverer exercised its right Aby purchase or by conquest,@ Indians remained
Athe rightful occupants of the soil with a legal as well as just claim to remain in possession of
it.@52 In 1832, Marshall elaborated on the legal significance of aboriginal title in Worcester v.
50
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Georgia.53
Worcester arose from an effort by the government of the state of Georgia to assert its
authority over the Cherokee Indians who were residing on a reservation with the state=s borders.54
In 1802, Georgia had ceded its claims to western lands in return for the promise of the United
States to extinguish the Indian claims to land within its boundaries as soon as it could be done
"peaceably" and on "reasonable terms." The Cherokees, however, with the encouragement and
aid of the federal government, had adopted farming in place of hunting, and had become attached
to their lands. They refused to move. Moreover, in 1827 they adopted a constitution based on
the United States model and declared themselves an independent nation. In response, the
Georgia state legislature adopted a series of laws that placed the Cherokee lands within several
counties of the state and declared that after June 1, 1830, Georgia law would be enforced in the
area and that all Indian customs and laws would be null and void. In addition, Indians were
denied the right to testify in cases involving whites, and whites were prohibited from
discouraging them from emigrating westward.
The Cherokees first sought to maintain an action in their own name challenging the
constitutionality of the Georgia statutes. In Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,55 Marshall spoke for a
majority of the justices in concluding that the Court lacked Article III jurisdiction over the suit.
However, the following term, in Worcester, the Court was faced with an appeal by a white
53
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missionary who had been convicted for violating the Georgia law which prohibited white men
from residing in Cherokee territory without a license from the state. In this procedural posture,
Worcester did not present the Article III problems that had characterized Cherokee Nation;
moreover, as a clear invocation of personal right, the case could not be characterized as involving
purely political questions. Thus, a decision on the merits became inevitable.
Once again speaking for the Court, Chief Justice Marshall concluded that the Georgia
statute was unconstitutional. Worcester is best known for holding that only Congress possessed
authority to regulate Indian tribes. In rejecting the state of Georgia=s argument, however,
Marshall was forced to confront the claim that Georgia possessed sovereignty over the Indian
lands because, under the doctrine of discovery, the Cherokees had no legally-cognizable property
interest in the land that they occupied. Rejecting this claim, Marshall emphasized the legal
significance of the aboriginal title that he had been recognized in Johnson, asserting that the
doctrine of discovery Aregulated the right...among the European discoverers, but could not affect
the right of those already in possession...as aboriginal occupants...It gave the exclusive right to
purchase [to the discoverer], but did not found that right on a denial of the right of the possessor
to sell.@56
In 1835, the Marshall Court once again focused on the status of aboriginal title in Mitchel
v. United States.57 In Mitchel, an English mercantile house had purchased large amounts of
property from the Seminole Indian tribe in Florida. The purchase was made with the permission
56

Worcester, 31 U.S. at 544

57

34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 711 (1835).

The most comprehensive treatment of Mitchel is David E. Wilkins, Johnson v. M=Intosh
Revisited: Through the Eyes of Mitchel v. United States, 19 Am. Ind. L. Rev. 171 (1994).

of the Spanish government, which was at that time generally recognized as the ruler of Florida.
Subsequently, Florida was ceded to the United States in the Adams-Onis Treaty of 1819. The
United States claimed that the rights that it had acquired by the treaty superceded the claim of the
successors to the purchaser from the Seminole tribe. The Court unanimously held that the claim
of the original purchasers had precedence.
The fact that the purchasers had acted with the blessing of the Spanish government
loomed large in the Court=s disposition of Mitchel. Nonetheless, the opinion of the Court is
notable for its emphasis on the significance of aboriginal title. Justice Henry Baldwin spoke for
the Court in Mitchel. Baldwin was something less than a consistent supporter of Native
American rights; for example, in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,58 he stood alone in arguing in
favor of the right of the state of Georgia to assert sovereignty over the Cherokee lands. In
Mitchel, however, he asserted that, during the colonial period, Athe friendly Indians were
protected in the possession of the lands they occupied, and were considered as owning them by a
perpetual right of possession in the tribe or nation inhabiting them from generation to
generation@59 and that Atheir hunting-grounds were as much in their actual possession as the
cleared fields of the whites.@60 Thus, Baldwin concluded, Atheir right of occupancy is considered
as sacred as the fee simple of the whites,@61 and that A[t]he Indian right to the lands as property
was not merely of possession, that of alienation was concomitant.@62
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With their emphasis on the legal significance of aboriginal title, Worcester and Mitchel
provide at least inferential support for the view that the abrogation of aboriginal title gives rise to
a Fifth Amendment claim for compensation. By contrast, a series of decisions in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries might be seen as pointing in the opposite direction.
These decisions did not deal directly with the status of aboriginal title. However, they reflect a
vision of congressional authority over Indian affairs that is virtually unfettered by extrinsic
constitutional constraints.63
The most infamous of these decisions is Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock.64 The complex fact
situation of Lone Wolf 65 revolved around the Medicine Lodge Treaty 1867, which provided that
the heads of families of the Kiowa and Commanche tribes could claim 320 acres from the
common land of the reservation as separate property, and provided further that reservation land
could not be ceded without the consent of three fourths of the male adult Indians occupying the
land. Later, the Apache tribe was brought under the same regime. In 1892, 456 adult males
signed a treaty ceding a ceding over two million acres of reservation land in exchange for a
payment of two million dollars, to be held in trust; the Indian agent certified that at the time, the
three tribes contained 562 male adults. After Congress adopted implementing legislation,
members of the relevant tribe sought to void the agreement. They alleged that the count of
eligible adult males was wrong, and that less than three quarters had in fact signed. Moreover,
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they contended that the signatures had been fraudulently obtained because the translator had
misled them regarding the amount that they would receive. Finally, they asserted that the
implementing legislation unlawfully changed the agreement that was signed. Under these
circumstances, the Indians argued that implementation of the agreement would violate the Fifth
Amendment by depriving them of a property interest which was established by treaty.
The Supreme Court unanimously rejected the Indians' argument. Speaking for the
majority, Justice Edward White quoted at length from the Court=s earlier decision in United
States v. Kagama66 and emphasized the plenary authority of Congress over Indian affairs--even in
the face of contrary treaty language
When...treaties were entered into between the United States and a tribe of Indians
it was never doubted that the power to abrogate existed in Congress, and that in a
contingency such power might be availed of from considerations of governmental
policy, particularly if consistent with perfect good faith towards the Indians
....
Congress [has full administrative power] over Indian tribal property. In effect,
the action of Congress now complained of was but an exercise of such power, a
mere change in the form in the investment of Indian tribal property, the property
of those who...were in substantial effect the wards of the government. We must
presume that Congress acted in perfect good faith in the dealings, with the Indians
of which complaint is made, and that the legislative branch of the government
exercised its best judgment in the premises. In any event, as Congress possessed
66
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Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 566-67, quoting United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375,

full power in the matter, the judiciary cannot question or inquire into the motives
which prompted the enactment of this legislation.67
While not directly addressing the issue of aboriginal title, the Lone Wolf Court=s emphasis
on the prerogatives of Congress plainly did not bode well for judicial protection of Indian land
claims generally. Indeed, if anything, one might have thought that the Lone Wolf plaintiffs stood
on stronger legal ground than subsequent parties who might seek to vindicate aboriginal title per
se. In Lone Wolf, the Native Americans could point to an agreement to which the federal
government had voluntarily acceded and which both parties must have believed to have been
legally binding. Nonetheless, the Court was willing in effect to allow Congress to modify the
agreement without the consent of the Native American parties. Intuitively, one might well have
expected the Court to be even less hospitable to claims based solely on common law principles
that established the rights of preexisting occupants.
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Subsequent caselaw, however, clearly revealed limits to Congressional power under the
Lone Wolf regime. In a series of decisions such as United States v. Creek Nation68 and Shoshone
Tribe of Indians v. United States, 69 the Court repeatedly and consistently held that the outright
transfer of tribal lands held under treaty required the government to pay compensation to the
affected tribes. These cases did not address the question of whether similar compensation was
required when aboriginal title was at stake. Nonetheless, decided as they were against the
background of the plenary power analysis of Lone Wolf, they could plausibly be viewed as
providing at least inferential support for a right to compensation in the absence of treaties.
For much of the twentieth century, jurisdictional barriers prevented the assertion of
claims for Native American compensation based on claims that were not derived from treaty
rights. In general, prior to 1946, the federal courts were granted jurisdiction only to hear Indian
land claims based on statute or treaty. By definition, the narrowness of this jurisdictional grant
excluded claims based on aboriginal title. However, the general grant of jurisdictional authority
was at times supplemented by statutes that expanded jurisdiction in specific, narrowly-defined
circumstances. For example, in 1935, Congress adopted a statute granting the Court of Claims
authority to hear cases involving Aany and all legal and equitable claims arising under or growing
out of the original Indian title claim or rights@ in lands described a number of unratified treaties
dealing with land originally located in the Oregon Territory.70 This statute laid the groundwork
for United States v. Alcea Band of Tillamooks71 [Tillamooks I], which ultimately found its way to
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the Supreme Court in 1946.
The story of Tillamooks I began in 1850, when Congress authorized the negotiation of
treaties with Indian tribes in the Oregon Territory. Acting under the authority provided by this
statute, in 1855, the representatives of the United States and the Alcea Tillamooks concluded a
agreement whereby the tribes agreed to cede much of their land in return for a cash payment and
the creation of a reservation. The treaty was to become operative only upon ratification.
Anticipating ratification, on November 9, 1855, President Franklin Pierce issued an Executive
Order creating a reservation for the Tillamooks whose dimensions were substantially the same as
those described in the treaty, and the Tillamooks were almost immediately confined to the
reservation. The size of the reservation was reduced by a new Executive Order in 1865. An
1875 statute further reduced the reservation. Finally, in 1894, Congress passed a statute officially
accepting and approving the reservation with the new dimensions. However, the original treaty
was never ratified, and the Tillamooks did not receive the cash payment promised in the
agreement.
In their suit in the Court of Claims, the Tillamooks sought compensation for being
deprived of their land. In addition to arguing that extinguishment of aboriginal title by its terms
constituted a cognizable taking under the Fifth Amendment, they relied on two statutory
arguments. First, they asserted that the 1935 statute creating jurisdiction in the Court of Claims
implicitly recognized aboriginal title as a compensable property interest. Second, they noted that
the 1848 statute establishing a government for the Oregon Territory provided that Anothing in this
act shall be construed to impair the rights of person or property now pertaining to the Indians in
[the Oregon] Territory, so long as such rights shall remain unextinguished by treaty between the

United States and said Indians.@72
After the Court of Claims ruled in favor of the Tillamooks, the government appealed to
the Supreme Court. With Justice Robert H. Jackson absent due to his participation in the
Nuremberg trials, the case was initially argued in early 1946 before a Court of eight justices. At
the initial conference, Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone and Justices Stanley F. Reed, Wiley B.
Rutledge and Harold H. Burton voted to reverse the Court of Claims and reject the claim for
compensation, while Justices Felix Frankfurter, William O. Douglas and Frank Murphy
supported the Tillamooks and Justice Hugo Lafayette Black expressed some uncertainty about
the proper resolution of the case. However, Stone died suddenly before the case was finally
resolved, and the case was put over for reargument. At the conference after the reargument,
Frederick M. Vinson, Stone=s replacement, announced his support for the position of the
Tillamooks. Black also took this view, creating a clear majority in favor of compensation.73
Vinson=s plurality opinion is replete with language that might be seen as supporting the
view that the extinguishment of aboriginal title carries with it an automatic right to
compensation. He began by asserting that A[a]dmitting the undoubted power of Congress to
extinguish original Indian title compels no conclusion that compensation need not be paid@74 that
A[t]he Indians have more than a mere moral claim for compensation,@75 and that denying the
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claim of the Tillamooks would Aignore the plain import of traditional methods of extinguishing
Indian title.@76 In addition, he explicitly rejected a rule that would allow recovery only in cases
where Congress had formally recognized the validity of the aboriginal title.77
However, Chief Justice Vinson stopped short of endorsing the principle that all aboriginal
title was protected by the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. While concluding that the
jurisdictional statute did not convey any substantive rights, he inferred a right to recovery from
the protections that had been provided by the 1848 statute.78 Concurring, Justice BlackBwhose
vote was critical to the establishment of any binding rule in Tillamooks IBwas even more explicit.
While arguing that right to compensation could be derived from the jurisdictional statute, Black
also asserted that A[b]efore Congress passed the special Act under which this suit was brought, I
think that the Government was under no more legal or ethical obligation to pay these respondents
than it was under obligation to pay whatever descendants are left of the numerous other tribes
whose lands and homes have been taken from them since the Nation was founded.@79
The Court clarified the import of its decision in Tillamooks I when United States v.
Tillamooks80 [Tillamooks II] returned to the Court five years later. On remand from Tillamooks I,
the Court of Claims had awarded of $3,000,000 plus interest from the date of the taking. The
government appealed from the award of interest, noting that interest was only appropriate if the
76
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damage award was founded on the Fifth Amendment and contending that the original decision
had been based instead on statutory authority. In a brief, per curiam opinion the Court accepted
the government=s argument, observing that A[l]ooking to the former opinions in this case, we find
that none of them expressed the view that recovery was grounded on a taking under the Fifth
Amendment.@81 Thus, when Tee-Hit-Ton came before the Court in 1955, the constitutional status
of aboriginal title remained uncertain.
In Tee-Hit-Ton, a clan of Tinglit Indians sought compensation after the Secretary of
Agriculture authorized the sale of timber from the Tongass National Forest in Alaska. The Court
of Claims found that, at the time that the United States acquired Alaska from Russia in 1867, the
Tee-Hit-Tons possessed aboriginal title to the land on which the timber was located. The TeeHit-Tons argued that their title had been recognized by an 1884 statute organizing the Alaska
Territory,82 but that if their title had not been officially recognized, they were entitled to
compensation because the sale of the timber effected a partial taking of their preexisting property
rights. The procedural barriers to the suit had been removed by the waiver of sovereign
immunity in the Indian Claims Commission Act of 1946.83 Nonetheless, a six-justice majority
not only held that the 1884 statute had not recognized any rights in the Tee-Hit-Ton, but also
rejected the Tee-Hit-Ton=s claim based on aboriginal title.
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Justice Stanley Reed, who had dissented in Tillamooks I,84 spoke for the Court in Tee-HitTon. Reed asserted that aboriginal title Ais not a property right but amounts to a right of
occupancy which the sovereign grants and protects against intrusion by third parties but which
right of occupancy may be terminated and such lands fully disposed of by the sovereign itself
without any legally enforceable obligation to compensate the Indians.@85 After reviewing the
caselaw, he stated flatly that AIndian occupation of land without government recognition of
ownership creates no rights against taking or extinction by the United States protected by the
Fifth Amendment or any other principle of law.@86 Reed was apparently deaf to the eerie
similarities between this conclusion and Roger Brooke Taney=s infamous claim that, at the time
the Constitution was drafted, free African-Americans Ahad no rights that the white man was
bound to respect.@87
Against this background, the contrast between Brown and Tee-Hit-Ton could not be more
stark. In Brown, the Court rejected deeply-ingrained legal traditions that had contributed to the
subjugation of African-Americans; in Tee-Hit-Ton, the Court reinforced the elements of the legal
regime that contributed to the decimation of Native American culture. Brown paved the way for
an improvement in the opportunities available to African-American; Tee-Hit-Ton denied
recompense to Native Americans for economic injuries. The question thus becomes why the
Court vindicated the interests of African-Americans while treating the claims of Native
84
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Americans so cavalierly.
III. Understanding the Dynamic of Brown and Tee-Hit-Ton
The respective decisions in Brown and Tee-Hit-Ton reflect the influence to two different
types of forces. The first is that of distinctively legal principlesBformal legal analysis. The
second is that of the more general political environment. Each of these forces played a
significant role in generating the disparate results in Brown and Tee-Hit-Ton.
Formal differences between the two cases were a necessary but not sufficient condition
for the Court=s disparate conclusions in Brown and Tee-Hit-Ton. The two cases involved quite
different claims of right, derived from quite different sources. Brown was an Fourteenth
Amendment equal protection claim that was based solely the positive authority of the
Constitution itself. In Tee-Hit-Ton, by contrast, the source of the constitutional claim was the
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Moreover, although all Native Americans had been
made citizens of the United States by statute in 1925, the argument of the plaintiffs was
ultimately based on a property interest that was not created by the Constitution, but instead
allegedly existed even before the first Europeans settled what was to become the United States.
However, only the most naive observer would suggest that the Court was moved entirely
or even primarily by formal considerations in Brown and Tee-Hit-Ton. Indeed, if one were to
focus only on formal concerns, he could argue persuasively that the Native Americans in TeeHit-Ton had a much stronger constitutional claim than the children in Brown. Despite their
ultimate support for the result, Justices Felix Frankfurter and Robert Jackson apparently believed
that Brown could not plausibly be viewed as reflecting any Aneutral@ principle of constitutional
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law.88 Obviously, the decision was inconsistent with existing precedent. In addition, it was based
on a view of the original understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment that was questionable at
best. By contrast, the commentators who have addressed the issue have often concluded that
Johnson, Worcester and Michel strongly suggested that the Native Americans claimants were
entitled to compensation in Tee-Hit-Ton.89
The difference between the treatment of Brown and Tee-Hit-Ton is more plausibly
explained by reference to the political dynamic of the mid-1950s. Beginning with the
presidential election of 1936, the African-American vote had been an important element of the
coalition that brought victories to Democrats Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman,
who in turn appointed almost all of the justices who decided both cases. Moreover, by 1954, the
issue of racial segregation had become an important issue in national politics. Indeed, Truman=s
decision to desegregate the military in 1946 had split the Democratic party along regional lines,
leading to the formation of a short-lived ADixiecrat@ party that nominated Strom Thurmond for
president in 1948 on an avowedly segregationist platform. With Thurmond depriving him of the
electoral votes of five normally-Democratic Southern states, Truman only defeated Thomas
Dewey because of overwhelming support from African-Americans in the North. Although the
Democratic party reunited in 1952, the issue of segregation and civil rights generally remained a
high-profile issue, with African-Americans having the support of a number of important political
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constituencies in the North.90
The situation of Native Americans was quite different. With a population of only
357,000 in 1950, Native Americans had no substantial impact on the political process, and few
influential allies in the white community. The disparity in political influence is illustrated
dramatically by the briefs filed in Brown and Tee-Hit-Ton. The position of the African-American
plaintiffs was supported not only by the United States government, but also by amicus briefs filed
by groups as disparate as the American Jewish Congress, the American Civil Liberties Union, the
American Federation of Teachers, the Congress of Industrial Organizations, and the American
Veterans Committee.91 By contrast, the only amicus briefs filed in Tee-Hit-Ton came from state
attorneys-general who were opposed the Native American claimants.92
The widespread support enjoyed by the plaintiffs in Brown and its progeny also reflected
a more basic aspect of the American political self-image. From much of the nation=s history, the
treatment of African-Americans in the South had been condemned by important figures in the
North as a regional aberration that was inconsistent with the basic values embodied in the
Declaration of Independence and the Constitution.93 Segregation in particular was seen as an
affront to the basic principles of equality embodied in the Reconstruction amendments (whatever
the original understanding of those amendments might have been.), as well as an embarrassment
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to a nation that was attempting to present itself to the Cold War world as the paragon of freedom,
justice, opportunity and equality.94 From this perspective, the decision in Brown did nothing
more than remove an anomaly that was a stain on the national character.
Conversely, a victory for the plaintiffs in Tee-Hit-Ton would have been inconsistent with
the image of America as a nation with a deep historical commitment to justice. The treatment of
the Tee-Hit-Tons by the federal government could not be dismissed as a isolated phenomenon.
Instead, in substantial measure, the nation owed its very existence to analogous actions. Thus, in
Tee-Hit-Ton, in his majority opinion, Justice Reed observed that A[e]very American schoolboy
knows that the savage tribes of this continent were deprived of their ancestral ranges by force,
and that, even when the Indians ceded millions of acres by treaty in return for blankets, food and
trinkets, it was not a sale but the conqueror=s will that deprived them of their land.@95 While
some scholars have disputed this characterization of the process by which the United States
acquired tribal lands,96 the belief that the government had acquired vast amounts of Indian
territory by force or fraud provides the backdrop for the Court=s decision in Tee-Hit-Ton.
Given these assumptions, the actions of the United States government and its citizenry
were justified by the widespread view that they were bringing civilization to a land that, despite
94
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the presence of Native Americans, was in a very real sense unclaimed. In 1945, Justice Jackson
captured the essence of this view in his concurring opinion in Northwestern Band of Shoshone
Indians v. United States97
The Indian parties to this treaty were a band of simple, relatively peaceful, and
extremely primitive men...The Indian parties did not know what titles were, had
no such concept as that of individual title, and had no sense of property in
land...Ownership meant no more to them than to roam the land as a great
common, and to possess and enjoy it in the same way that they possessed and
enjoyed sunlight and the west wind and the feel of spring in the air.98
Under this view, the white settlers and their government could plausibly claim that they had not
done anything fundamentally wrong in asserting ownership over territory that Native Americans
had previously seen as their homeland. Of course, the government was still bound honor its
agreements, and might also be viewed as having some moral obligation toward Native
Americans. However, the government could still argue that it had not deprived Native
Americans of any right that was seen as truly fundamental in the Anglo-American tradition.
This position, however, could not survive a holding that the abrogation of aboriginal title
per se gave rise to a claim of constitutional magnitude. Such a holding would have decisively
labeled the displacement of Native American claims as a massive, unjust expropriation of
propertyBa particularly striking example of what today we would describe as ethnic cleansing.
This conclusion fits at best uneasily with the concept of a nation that purports to be founded upon
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principles of law and justice.
Viewed against this background, Brown and Tee-Hit-Ton can be seen as complimentary
rather than conflicting. On one hand, the Brown Court sought to eliminate practices that the
dominant political faction viewed as aberrational and inconsistent with basic American principles
of equality and justice. On the other, Tee-Hit-Ton minimized the import of the injustices
inherent in the process by which the nation was established. Thus, in both cases, the decisions of
the Court worked to bolster and reinforce the image that Americans had of themselves and
sought to project to the world at large in the mid-1950s.
Conclusion
Any number of important lessons can be drawn from Brown and Tee-Hit-Ton. First,
taken together, the cases illustrate the complexity of racial issues in America. Both cases
involved the claims of racial minority groups. Both groups had suffered grievously at the hands
of the dominant whites. However, the two groups had quite different relationships with the white
power structure, and the ultimate decisions in the two cases reflected the influence of these
differences.
More generally, taken together, the two decisions reveal the flaws in the most common
justification for judicial activism that does not reflect the original understanding of the
Constitution. Many commentators have justified such activism on the ground that judges are
institutionally well-positioned to make dispassionate assessments of the merits of fundamental
moral arguments. Thus, for example, Owen Fiss argues that judges search for what is Atrue, right
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and just,@99 and Ronald Dworkin contends that nonoriginalist judicial review Ainsures that the
most fundamental issues of political morality will finally be set out and debated as issues of
principle and not simply as issues of political power, a transformation that cannot succeed, in any
case not fully, within the legislature.@100 The decision in Brown is often seen as one of the
quintessential example of the operation of this process.
When juxtaposed with Tee-Hit-Ton, however, Brown emerges in a quite different light.
Without question, racial segregation was and is fundamentally wrong, and the elimination of
segregated schools was a vindication of an important moral principle. However, the moral claim
of the Brown plaintiffs was certainly no stronger than that of the Native Americans whose land
was expropriated without even the shadow of consent. Against this background, the result in
Brown cannot be seen as reflecting special judicial competence in dealing with basic moral
questions. Rather, it must be seen as the result of a historical fortuity that created a Court that
was dominated by adherents to Northern, liberal ideology on racial issues. We can and should
celebrate the result of this fortuity; however, we should not overstate its significance for the
justification of judicial review more generally.
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